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ABSTRACT
,
ThIs paper outlines quantitative assessment of a critical event in the sub-section of a process
plant wherein a key ingredient required for the manufacture of propellants is produced. This
sub-section is identified as possessing a fire hazard by qualitative HAZAN techniques. Fault tree and
safety'. tree analyses have been used to identify basic equipment and the operational failures whichI
could lead to top event oc~urrence and to calculate its probability .Consequence analysis of one of the
probable scenari9~ has lead to an estimation of risk in terms of fatality and injury .These results form
basic inputs for risk management decisions:
well as in the manner of their processing, have
paradoxically attracted little attention.
The process of production of key ingredients
of propellants is divided into a number of separate
sections, each section handling one step in the
overall process. This is in contrast to most modern
continuous chemical process plants having single
stream ope~ation. Many sub-sections of such plants
pose a major/hazard in themselves and require
detailed hazard analysis and risk assessment.
Technological developments in the design of
chemic'aJ plants have taken a quantum leap in the
recent past. The pressure to keep pace, however,
offers little opportunity for plant designers to learn
by gradual evolution and experience. It also tends
to make the designs somewhat vulnerable to
failure. This is especially true in case of plants
handling explosive~, propellants ana such materialst
under. extremes of operating conditions. It is
therefore necessary to reduce the probability of
I
failure and to evolve safe design and operating
NOMENCLATURE i
m" Rate of evaporationl (kg/m2.s)
I
4 Length of flame, (m~
d Diameter of liquid pool (m)
I
E Average intensity. of radiation (Wm-2)
I
VP Vapour pressure (Pa)
t Atmospheric coeffic.ient of transmission
r Distance to thej fire (m)
q, Heat flow density at distance r.(Wm-2)
I'
A (1+ Y)7 + X2
B (I-Y; + X2
I
F max MaxiTum view factor
a Height of flar;ne (m)
I I
b Radius of flame (m)
1. INTRODUCTION t
Risk assessment of chemical j process plants
has receivfd world.lwide attentionl 5. On the other
hand, prQcess plants dealing with explosives,
propellantt and similar hazardqus materials, both in
terms of intrinsic Aatur~ of materials handled as
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practices by identifying potential hazards and
gaining some 'synthetic' experience of running the
plu/lt. Thi~ pIlpCr:llim!; ut qllll/ltiryi/lg thc!;c hll".lIrd!;
and their consequences by using well-known teCh-
niques of fault tree analysis, safety tree analysis,
and consequence analysis.
3. FAULT TREE AINALYSIS' ,
Based on FETI analysis and HAZOP studies,
Cnlllt trcc nnnlysis Cor tllc criticnl cvcni 'Circ in
bonding agent pr!eparation room' has been carried
out. Fault tr~e an'alysis gives all Vossible minimum
combinlltions of basic huma~, instrument or
equipment failur,s, calledl minimal cut-sets, which
could lead to the occurrence of the cri~ical event,
also called 'top event' .In other words, the solution
of the fault tree yields a number of sets of events,
,
with each set comprising of one or more basic
events, whose simultaneous occurrence would lead
.Ito the unwanted top event. A number of events
constituting each set determine the order of the set.
Cut-sets are ranked in an increasing order, with
single order cut-sets being ranked first, followed by
cut-sets of order two, three and so on. A q\,1anti-
tative estimation of the prJbability of occurrence of
,
top event is mad~ by assigning appropriate failure
I
rates to each of the basic failures.
2. THE PROCESS
In the propellant manufacture process, the key
ingredients are: Oxidizer, fuel, binder, bobding
agent, plasticizer, catalysts, etc. Raw materials
undergo various stages of preparation before they
are termed key ingredients. The .key irigredients are
then processed by mixing, casti~g, etc. to get the
end product.
2.1 Hazard Identification
Fire explosion and toxicity index (FETI)
analysis and the hazard and operability (HAZOP)
studies have pinpointed certain sections of the plant
as more hazardous. In particular, the preparation of
the bonding agent involves handling and process-
ing of toxic and flammable chemicals under
hazardous operating conditions. This section has
been identified as a moderate fire and toxic hazard
on the basis of FETI analysis. The HAZOP study
has revealed that, in case of fire, there is a
possibility of exposure due to skin contact and
inhalation of toxic fumes. oh the basis of this
study, the preparation of the bonding agent has
been taken up for detailed qualitative and quanti-
tative hazard assessment using various well-
established techniques.
2.2 ' Bonding Agent Preparation
Preparation of the bonding agent involves
distillation of methyl aziridinyl phosphine o~ide
(MAPO) with two dicarboxylic acids-tartaric acid
and adipic acid-in the presence of methanol unper
total reflux. Methanol, used as a solvent in this
process, is recovered by differential vacuum
distillation.
3.1 Fault Tree 'Constructirn
A fault tree has been constructed for the top
,
event. The completed tree is shown in Figs 1 (a) and
,
1 (b). A study of this tree shows th~t the top event
can occur only if spill of r MAPO occurs
simultaneously with occurrence ,of fire in the
.1
preparation room. Each of the' events has been
broken ,down into -its basic cau:ses. MAPO is
brought into the process robmlin SS containers. The
required quantity of MAPO i& then 'transferred into
a beaker. Using a ~adder, an operator'pours the
ingrbdient down the reaction flask, The MAPO
spill could take place elither during this transfer1
operation, or due to cracks in the benker or flask,'
, )
Sub-tree for 'fire in the room' is more complex
as the fire could result'due to various !interacting
t
causes. It could\result from either a fire within the
I
fla~k or due to an external source, (The presence of
fuel (n,ethanol in this case), oxidizer ~atmospheric
ox)lgen), and ~ source of ignition isl essential to
f ,
,
19R
-.I:
RAJAGOPAL & JAIN : QUAN"nTA11VE RISK ASSFSSMENT
EXT~RNAl
FIRE
--0/- "'
I FUEL \
tMETHANO~
,105/
---(10) .
SOURCE OF
IGNITION
I (HOT SPOT) f-'-0OXIDiZffi
NitROGEN
INERTING
FAILS
VACUUM FAILURE
DURING FLASH
EVAPORAnON LEGEND
C ~M FALS
112
(OJ)
Figure l(a~. Fault tree for lire In bonding agent preparation room
cause this fire. Taking up lfire in the f1a~k', oxygen
could be present due to one of the two possibilities
I
-failure of nitrogen inerting or a vacuum failure
during flash evaporation. Considering only one of
these events, 'vacuum. failure' could occur as a
result of anyone of the basic failures, namely,
vacuum pump failure, vacuum line failure, or
power failure.
branch, numbers of s"ub-nodes, and probability of
occurrence of each node. The outputs of cut-sets
are sorted and arranged in the order of .d.ecreasing
frequency of occurrence. The failure rates of events
are biased on data from several sources5.6 suitably
modified, where necessary, to account for Indian
conditions.i
Similarly, each of thie intermediate events is
,broken up I into I its contributory basic failures
resulting in I various branches of the fault tree as
shown in Figs l(a) & l(b). A coOljputer programme
!
developed for the analysi~ of fauli tree has been
used to calculate the minimal cut-sets. The data to
I
this program is inp~t through value~ in a se(.Jucnce
of main node number, type of gate ~onnecting it to
nexl eventt(AND, OR), number of s~b-nodes in that
j
I
3.2 Fault Tre~ Analysis
The total number of minimal cut-sets for this
tree has been computed to be 312, of which there
are no 'sjngle, double, or triple point cut-sets. In
other words, the minimum number of events whose
simultaneous failure will cause the top event to
occur, is four. The minimal cut-sets in the order of
decreasing probability of occurrence of top event
or increasing number of years between each fault
arc iistcd ill Tablc II. Probability of occurrence of
,
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Figure l(b). Fault tree for fire In bonding agent preparation room
this critical event, 'fire in bonding agent prepara-
I
tion room', works out to be 0.036 times a year or
about 28 years between each occurrence.
(a) Supply failures: Power supply failure,
(b) Equipment & instrument~ failures: Vacuum
pump failure, temp~rature gauge failure, andj
Table I. Fault tree analysis: Criticality ranking or occurrenc or
,top event In bonding agent preparation room
,
(c) '. Operator errors:, Transfer operations involving
, MAPO, incQmplete opening of valve in nitrogen
f I '
.me.
Power supply ~ailure is a com~on mode
failure, occurring in ~wo branche~ of the tree, which
meet at an AND gate. This makes it.j.mperative that
an alternate source, of power su~ly should be
provided. qperator-related failure rates are gener-
ally higher ras compared to the instrument failure
,I rates and are often unpredictable I. These can be
mihimised ,by proper training and *dherence to laid
' d I
own norms. !
The key basic failures which lead to the high
frequency of top event occurrence are:
3.3 ~afety A nalysis ,
The safety analysis bf 'fire in bonding agent
preparation room' is carried out to fi~d all possible
200
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ways of reducing probaqility of occurrence of the
critical event. Safety tree is basically the logical
reverse of h fault tree and is constructed by inter-
changing all AND anq OR gates in the original
fault tree. The analysis of this tree gives the
minimum combination bf events for the avo,idancej
of top event. t
I
whose proper functioning is critiqal to the system
safety. On the basis of these obseryations, several
recommendations regarding design/maintenance
have been made. Sensitivity a~alysis further
highlights the effects of incorporating these
recommendations on system safety.
I ,
I ,
Table 2. Mlnlmal \ Cut-sets for safety tr,ee forjbondlng agent
prepara' on room I
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
An analysis of the effects of various suggested
modifications on the top event probability is
presel)ted in Table 3. As seen from this table,
effects of various suggested improvements in the
design/operations result in an improvement ofI
several orders of magnitude in thd system safety.
Cul-sels
(124)
(125)
(116)
(116)
(121)
(1&2)
(116)
(117)
(117)
(117)
(126)
(124)
(li5)
(122)
(103)
(121)
(118)
(118)
(118)
(126)
(123)
(104)
(122)
(170)
(110)
(120)
(105)
(101)
(115)
(114)
(114)
(114)
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis: Effect of recommendations on
system safety
(123)
(124)
(125)
(121)
Basic failure Suggcstcd
recommen-
dations
Top event
OCCUITence
(ye~ between each fault)
MOOifications
(126)
(122) (123
Power failure Aulo-start gcneralor
Spillage of. a) Reduce no. of
MAPO transfer operations
b) Transfer f)vcr
shallow pans/tubs
Vacuum pump Slandby pump
failure
Incomplete Alarm fitted to
opening of pressure gauge
valve in nitro- in nitrogen line
gen line
Incorrect Adequately lightal
reading of digilal display
thcrrro~ter
Presence of Water deluge
~thanol spill system 10 dilute
~thanol spill
1150 2012
2012 3621
Table 2. lists ten minimal cut-sets ranging
I
from 2 to 7 point cu~-sets in the order of increasing
number of basic e:v~nts per cut-set. For the safety
analysis. only the firs~. four cut-sets are being
I
considered. Cut-sets with five or more events are
I
being ignored as being imptacticable.
I
It is evident from Table 21 that sttict adherence
to safety norms and extreme tare by workers both
I.
during material transfer operations and temperature
monitoring are essentia~ for improvi~g the safety of
this section. Some of the points requiring specific
attention are:
3621 10863
10863 32589
(a) Avoidance of methanol and MAPO spills during.
transfer operations and checking of containe~ for
cracks, and . I
4. CONSEQUEN~E ANALYSIS
Consequence analysis for the event 'fire in
bonding agent preparation room' brings out the
physical effects of a pool fire caused by a methanol
spill onl ,the ground and estimates the damage
caused to human beings due to such effects.
(b) Avoidance of operl flames, sparks, and ariy other
source of ignition in the;room.
..
3.4 Results of Faplt Tree & Safety Analyses
The.f~u~, tree and safety an~lyses have b:ought
out specIfIc Instruments, operatIons and equlpm~nt
201
4.1 Physical Effects
A heat radiation model5 has been used to
calculate the effects of methano~ fire in terms of
heat fluxes at various distances from the' fire. The
heat load, qr' is given as
./
'\
\
q, = 'ti X F x E
where f
I,
\\ iI\
\ i
'tl = Atmospheric coefficient of transmission
F = Geometric view factor
E = Average intensity of radiation (W m -2)
The following assumptions are made in this
model:
"'
"'. ,/'
,/
.,
" /'...
~
, ;
I
-
--.
Figure 2. Model for methano! pool nre
!I
(C) E, the avera~e intensity of radiation (calculated) is
9.86kWm- .:
I
The thermal load q ha~ been calculated at
various. distance's (r) from the fire and the results
are ~resented in Table 4.
4.2 Damage Model for :Ueat Radiation
Injuries caused by heat radiatipn at various
,
thermal loads (at various distances from the fire)
and at v,arious exposure times have beenjcalculated
using this modelt It is assumed that everyone inside
the area' covered by the burning pool will be
asphyxfated or burnt to death. Probft equations
[Eqns (2) and (3)] are used to calculate respectively
the percentage of lethalil~ and first degree burns
that will ,occur at a particular thermal load and
period of exposure to an unprbtected body,
I
(a) Surface area of the pool caused by the spill is
constant, and
(b) The pool is round.
Only the stationary fire phase is described. TheI
initial ignition and fire development are not consi-
dered. Both assumptions (a) and (b) are valid in the
present case. In case of (a), it is expected that the
spread of the pool will take plaee immediately after
the outflow when the fire is still not well
,
dev~loped. In case of (b), there being no restriction
to the flow of li'quid, the liquid methanol would
tend to assume a circular shape (Fig. 2).
I
The values of relevant parameters assumed in
obtaining these results are:
(a) Ambient temperature -38 °c
(b) All the methanol is spilled (about 201)
Table 4. Radiation loads at various distances from fire
Pr = -36.38 + 2.56 In (t.~ 413) (2)
Pr = -39.83 + 3.01861" (t.q4/3) (3)
0.1 1.335 0.090 2.97() 2.611
0.5 1.335 0.448 3.886 2.086
1 1.3350.897 5.380'1.7930.5783352 0.915186.162I
2 1.335 1.794 9.587 2.412 0.228 6704 0.86 1933:348
,
5 1.335 4.484 31.86p 13.9230.037 16760 0.81 295.504
where
t is the exposure time in seconds
202
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i
-
at various time intervals and for various types of
expo~ures (lethality, first degree burns).
I ,
It .is assumed that injuries will be reduced by
a factor of seven if people are wearing protective
clothing. Tables 5 and 6 give the, results both in
terms of probits and percentages (in brackets) of
the persons who suffer from the symptoms due to
exposure.
q is the thermal load in W m-2 ~
Pr is tpe probit which can be bonverted to a
percentage pf exposed persons who will suffer the
I
above syml'toms. I
I j
The calculated values of q match well with the
results of srpall scale experiments with methanol as
reported in TNO by Hoftijzer7. For each value of q
calculated asl shown in Table 4, Pr can be calculated
I
Table 5. Pro~lt values for various radiation loads (lethal)
I
I
Table 6. Problt values for various radiation loads (first degree Iburns)
2 1933.30 4.451
(29 %)
6.543
(94 %)
9.;>.09
(100 %)
11.401 13.494
s 295.50 3.860
(13 %)
.5.953
(83 %)
5. RISK ASSESSMENT4.3 Consequence Analysis Calculations
,
In the event of fire, worlters would sustain first
I
degree burns within 3 min if they are within 2 m
I
but not within the radius of fire but will sustain a
I
fatal injury if they are within the radiuls of fire.
I
Assuming that the total response time for the
persons to move out of the rbom is 30 s, the fatality
.I
rate would be about 0.5 per cent. For two persons
in the room it works out to 0.01 deatps per event.
Also 41 per cent of the people exposed wo!lld
suffer first degree burns, which is 0.8:2 injuries per
event (Table 6).
5.1 Calculation or Risk
In the fault tree for 'file in bonding agent
preparation room', the probability of occurrence of
a methanol fire due to spills has been calculated to
be 3 x 10-4 per year (Fig. lA). Since both the
probability of occurrence and the consequences are
known, the risk can be calculated as:
Risk = Probability x Consequences
4
= 3 x 10' events per year x 0.01 death per event
= 3 x 10-6 deaths per year
203
and modifications to the existing design or
operating procedures for improving the process
safety.
5.2 Acceptable Risk
For chemical industries, the accepted figure
for fatal accident frequency rates (FAFR) per 1 (j)8
working hours is 4. The total working hours in the
bonding agent preparation being about 1600 per
year, the FAFR for methanol fire in this room
works out to 0.2. This value of FAFR is well within
acceptable limits. However, if there is any delay in
escaping from the room due to injury or mishap,
the FAFR for a response time of 60 s will be 1.7,
which is still within the acceptable limits.
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